RFID Traceability: A Multilayer Problem by Avoine, Gildas & Oechslin, Philippe
RFID Traceability: A Multilayer Problem
Gildas Avoine and Philippe Oechslin
EPFL
Lausanne, Switzerland
Abstract. RFID tags have very promising applications in many do-
mains (retail, rental, surveillance, medicine to name a few). Unfortu-
nately the use of these tags can have serious implications on the privacy
of people carrying tagged items. Serious opposition from consumers has
already thwarted several trials of this technology. The main fears associ-
ated with the tags is that they may allow other parties to covertly collect
information about people or to trace them wherever they go. As long as
these privacy issues remain unresolved, it will be impossible to reap the
benefits of these new applications. Current solutions to privacy problems
are typically limited to the application layer. RFID system have three
layers, application, communication and physical. We demonstrate that
privacy issues cannot be solved without looking at each layer separately.
We also show that current solutions fail to address the multilayer aspect
of privacy and as a result fail to protect it. For each layer we describe
the main threats and give tentative solutions.
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1 Introduction
Often presented as a new technological revolution, Radio Frequency Identifica-
tion (RFID) systems make possible the identification of objects in an environ-
ment, with neither physical nor visual contact. They consist of transponders
inserted into the objects, of readers which communicate with the transponders
using radio frequencies and usually of a database which contains information
on the tagged objects. This technology is not fundamentally new. It has existed
for several years, for example for ticketing on public transport, on motorway
tollgates or ski-lifts and also for animal identification.
The boom which RFID technology is enjoying today rests essentially on the
willingness to develop transponders which are cheap and of reduced size. The
direct consequence of this step is a reduction in the capacity of the transpon-
ders, that is to say their computation, storage and communication capacities.
This willingness is due (in part) to the Auto-ID Center1 whose purpose is to
standardise and promote very cheap RFID technology, by reducing the price
1 The Auto-ID Center split in 2003, giving rise to the EPCGlobal Inc. [4] and the
Auto-ID Labs [1].
of transponders to less than 5 cents. Because of their reduced capacities, these
transponders, usually called tags, bring their share of problems, in particular
with regard to privacy issues, whether it be information leakage or traceability.
Firstly, we will present the existing and potential applications related to
RFID and we will give a brief description of the technology. Then we will present
in Section 2 the privacy threats in RFID systems and we show that contrary to
the three well-known cryptographic concepts, i.e., confidentiality, authenticity,
and integrity, traceability cannot be ensured in the application layer only, but
it must be ensured in each of the layers of the communication model. We will
then analyse the traceability threats in each of the three layers of the radio
frequency communication model and we will suggest some ideas in order to
thwart them. We will go from the application layer in Section 3 to the physical
layer in Section 5. We will finally summarise our analysis in Section 6.
1.1 RFID Applications
Advocates of RFID tags call them the super barcodes of the future. Based on
a very different technology, identification by radio frequency represents a major
innovation in relation to optical identification. In addition to the miniaturisation
of the tags which allows them to be implanted within objects, it allows objects
to be read en masse, without the need for visual contact. It should also be noted
that each tag has a unique identifier: whilst a bar code represents a group of
objects, an electronic tag represents a single object.
One area of application for RFID tags is the management of stock and inven-
tories in shops and warehouses. The American mass-marketing giant, Wal-Mart,
has recently placed a requirement on its suppliers that they use electronic tags
on the palettes and packaging boxes that are delivered to it. This is a progres-
sive policy and, at the beginning, it will only affect suppliers of pharmaceutical
products.
The introduction of RFID tags in all articles could also directly benefit the
consumer. One obsession of customers is cutting the waiting time at tills, by re-
placing the shop assistants with an entirely automated device: one would simply
pass the contents of the trolley through a reading tunnel. This application will
not see the light of day anytime soon, principally for technical reasons, but also
for a less frequently thought about reason like fraud. Indeed, the electronic tags
can be cloned or rendered ineffective through various processes, which clears the
way for malicious activity. Even though barcodes can equally be cloned by a
simple photocopy, this type of fraud is thwarted by a human presence when the
goods are scanned at the till: in case of doubt, the shop assistant can verify the
appropriateness of a product with the description corresponding to the barcode.
Some visionaries go even further: the tags could contain information useful in
the home, like washing, cooking or storing instructions. Thus maybe the wash-
ing machine that asks for confirmation before washing whites with reds or the
refrigerator that discovers that a pot of “cre`me fraˆıche” stored on its shelves is
no longer as fresh as its name suggests may no longer be science fiction?
These domestic applications are still experimental and should not detract
from the very real applications which already surround us, e.g., the identification
of pets by RFID is already a part of our everyday lives. In the European Union,
this practice is already obligatory in some countries and will extend across the
whole EU in a few years.
1.2 RFID Technology
Very cheap tags, electronic microcircuits equipped with an antenna, have ex-
tremely limited computation, storage, and communication capacities, because of
the cost and size restrictions imposed by the targeted applications.
They have no microprocessors and are only equipped with a few thousand
logic gates at the very most, which makes it a real challenge to integrate encryp-
tion or signature algorithms into these devices. This difficulty is reinforced by
the fact that the tags are passive, meaning that they do not have their own en-
ergy source: they use the power supplied by the magnetic or electric field of the
reader. Let us note, however, that promising research is being done at the mo-
ment, notably the implementation of AES for RFID tags proposed by Feldhofer,
Dominikus and Wolkerstorfe [6].
The storage capacities of RFID tags are also extremely limited. The cheapest
devices have only between 64 and 128 bits of ROM memory, which allows the
unique identifier of the tag to be stored. Adding EEPROM memory remains an
option for more developed applications. Whilst some memory zones can be made
remotely inaccessible, the tags are not tamper-resistant, unlike smartcards made
for secure applications (credit cards, pay TV, etc.).
The communication distance between tags and readers depends on numerous
parameters, in particular the communication frequency. Two principal categories
of RFID systems coexist: the systems using the frequency 13.56MHz and the sys-
tems using the frequency 860-960MHz, for which the communication distance is
greater. In this latter case, the information sent by the reader can in practice
be received up to a hundred meters, but the information returned from the tag
to the reader reaches a few meters at most. These limits, resulting from stan-
dards and regulations, do not mean that the tags cannot be read from a greater
distance: non-conforming equipment could exceed these limits, for example by
transgressing the laws relating to the maximum authorised power.
2 Privacy Threats
Among the security issues related to RFID technology, one can distinguish those
which threaten the functionality of the system from those which pose a threat to
the privacy of its users, i.e., by divulging information about the user or allowing
the user to be traced. The fact that the tags can be invisible, that they can be
read remotely, and that they have a long life (considering that they do not have
their own energy source), makes these privacy issues worse. Moreover, the ease
of recording and automatically dealing with the logs obtained by RFID systems
contributes to the desire for protection against the undesirable effects of these
systems.
Beyond the usual denial of service attacks, threats to the functionality of
RFID systems are linked to the falsification of the tags and their concealment.
As discussed in the previous section, a cheap tag cannot benefit from protection
mechanisms such as those enjoyed by smartcards made for secure applications.
Therefore an adversary can obtain the memory content and create a clone of
the tag. This operation is obviously simplified if the tag openly transmits all its
data, as is the case in the common applications. Although reducing the reading
distance reduces the risks of eavesdropping, it is not a satisfactory solution. High
gain antennas and use of non conforming power levels may still make it possible
to read a tag from greater distances. The possibility of neutralising the tags also
prevents the correct functioning of the system. The totally automated trolley
reader discussed in Section 1.1 is particularly vulnerable to this kind of attack,
since foil or a simple chips packet can be enough to neutralise the tag by forming
a Faraday cage.
Below we will concentrate on threats to the privacy of RFID tag carriers.
These threats fall into two categories: information leakage and traceability.
2.1 Information Leakage
The disclosure of information arising during the transmission of data by the
tag reveals data intrinsic to the object or its environment. For example, tagged
pharmaceutical products could reveal data about the health of a person. An
employer, insurer or other party could have a particular interest in knowing the
state of health of a person that he is close to, and could so obtain sensitive infor-
mation. The tags are not, however, made to contain or transmit large quantities
of data. When a database is present in the system, the tag can send a simple
identifier, so that only the people who have access to this database can match
the identifier to the corresponding information. This is the principle adopted by
systems using barcodes.
2.2 Traceability
The problem of traceability is more complex. Even if a tag only transmits an
identifier, this information can be used to trace an object in time and space. If a
link can be established between a person and the tags he is carrying, the tracing
of objects can become the tracing of a person. An attacker may want to trace
a given tag, either deterministically or probabilistically, starting from either an
active or passive attack.
A simple approach for dealing with the problem of privacy is to prevent the
readers from receiving data coming from the tags. Besides the difficulty of putting
these techniques into practice, they have the pernicious side-effect that they can
also be used by an adversary to harm the system. The first technique arising from
the need to ensure privacy is to kill the tag. The technique is effective but has the
major inconvenience that the tag can no longer be used. A less radical method
consists of preventing the tag from hearing the request by enclosing the tag in
a Faraday cage as we have already mentioned. This solution is only suitable
for a few precise applications, e.g., money wallets, but is not for general use:
animal identification is an example of an application which could not benefit
from this technique. The third technique consists of preventing the reader from
understanding the reply. The best illustration of this technique is surely the
blocker tag [14] which aims to prevent a reader from determining which tags are
present in its environment. Broadly, the blocker tag relies on the tree walking
protocol (see Section 4.2) and simulates the full spectrum of possible identifiers.
Another approach is to design protocols which can identify the tags without
compromising the privacy of their carriers. In spite of the huge interest that
RFID technology has caused (and the fears of consumers), relatively few people
have worked on such protocols. Sarma, Weis and Engels were the first to take a
step in this direction [19]. Other protocols were then put forward, in particular
by Juels et al. [13], Ohkubo et al. [16], Henrici and Mu¨ller [7], Feldhofer et al. [6],
Molnar and Wagner [15], etc. Up until now, little work has been done to prove
the security or to exhibit weaknesses of the proposed protocols. Only Avoine [2]
and Saito et al. [18] paved the way by showing weaknesses in some existing
schemes.
Unfortunately, we will show in Section 2.3 that even if an identification pro-
tocol is proven to ensure the privacy in the classical adversarial models, this does
not mean that the protocol truly ensures privacy in practice.
2.3 Relationship Between Traceability and Layers
The three main concepts that are considered in cryptography are confidentiality,
integrity and authentication. To analyse these concepts, a model of the adversary
is defined, that is, the actions that the adversary may carry out on the entities
and their communication channels in order to compromise confidentiality, in-
tegrity or authentication. This model is usually defined in theoretic notions like
tamperproofness of the entities or timeliness of the channels without considering
the exact nature of the underlying physical architecture.
The communication channels are usually devised using a layered approach
(as in the OSI model [12]). By implementing a corresponding protocol at a given
layer, confidentiality, integrity or authentication can be guaranteed indepen-
dently from the characteristics of the lower layers. With regard to traceability,
the problem is very different. Each layer can reveal information which can be
used to trace a tag and we have to prove that the system is tracing-resistant at
each layer. Thus, a protocol that is safe with regard to traceability in a classic
adversary model may not be safe in practice. This is the case for all RFID proto-
cols that have been described in the literature, since lower layers are never taken
into consideration. It is thus of paramount importance to investigate traceability
issues at each layer of the communication model. Below we refer to the model
in Fig. 1 which is compatible with the ISO standard 18000-1 [10]. It is made of
three layers, the application, the communication and the physical layer.
– The application layer handles the information defined by the user. This
could be information about the tagged object (e.g., the title of a book) or
more probably an identifier allowing the reader to extract the corresponding
information from a database. To protect an identifier, an application protocol
may transform the data before it is transmitted or deliver the information
only if certain conditions are met.
– The communication layer defines the way in which the readers and tags
can communicate. Collision avoidance protocols are found in this layer as
well as an identifier that makes it possible to single out a specific tag for
communication with a reader (this identifier does not have to be the same
as the one in the application layer).
– The physical layer defines the physical air interface, that is to say, the fre-









Fig. 1. Communication model
Up to now, very little of the work done has addressed this problem. We can
cite Juels et al. [14], Molnar and Wagner [15], and Weis [21]. In the following
sections we will analyse privacy issues (traceability) at each of the three layers
of the communication model.
3 Traceability at the Application Layer
3.1 Identification Protocols
We explained in Section 2.3 that the traceability issue has to be considered in
each of the three layers of the communication model. Up until now, only the
application layer has been extensively studied (e.g., [7,13,15,16,19]). Broadly, all
these works are based on the fact that the information sent by the tag to the
reader changes at each identification. This information is either the identifier of
the tag or an encrypted value of it. What differentiates the existing protocols
is the way in which this information is refreshed between two identifications.
Usually, during this process, the reader supplies the tag with the next value to
send (new identifier or new ciphertext) or data allowing the tag to carry out
the refreshment by itself. So, we can represent many of the RFID protocols by
a 3-round protocol whose exchanged messages contain respectively the request,
the identifier of the tag, and data to refresh the identifier.
Therefore, in order to avoid traceability, the information sent by the tag
needs to be indistinguishable (by an adversary) from a random value and to
be used only once. If the reader is involved in the refreshment process, it can
voluntarily send information which is not indistinguishable from a random value.
We characterise the RFID protocols according to whether the reader is or is not
involved in the refreshment process.
In the first case, the tag must be able to generate new information by itself.
For example, Ohkubo et al. [16] propose an RFID protocol where the tag can
refresh its identifier by itself by using two hash functions. Obviously, the identifier
is used only once since the tag changes it by itself as soon as an identification is
completed. Whilst this scheme is proven secure from the point of view of privacy,
it suffers from scalability issues. Avoine and Oechslin [3] however have shown
that complexity can be significantly reduced using a time-memory trade-off.
In the case where the reader is involved in the regeneration of the information,
we need to be sure that this information is indistinguishable (by an attacker)
from a random value, but also that this information is used only once. Many of
the existing protocols suffer from these two problems. This shows the difficulty
of defining tracing-resistant RFID protocols if the tag depends on the reader
for generating such values. To illustrate our point, we present below an attack
against the protocol of Henrici and Mu¨ller [7].
3.2 Case Study: Protocol of Henrici and Mu¨ller
The principle of the protocol is as follows: after the personalisation phase, the
tag contains its current identifier (ID), the current session number i and the
last successful session number i∗. When the system is launched, the database
contains a list of entries, one for each tag it manages. Each entry contains the
same data as is stored in the tag, augmented by a hash value of ID, h(ID), which
constitutes the database primary key and other additional data. ID and i are set
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Fig. 2. Protocol of Henrici and Mu¨ller
1. The reader sends a request to the tag.
2. The tag increases its current session number by one. It then sends back h(ID),
h(i ◦ ID) and ∆i := i − i∗ to the reader which forwards the values to the
database. Here ◦ is a “suitable conjunction function”; “A simple exclusive-
or function is adequate for the purpose” [7]. h(ID) allows the database to
recover the identity of the tag in its data; h(i ◦ ID) aims at thwarting replay
attacks and ∆i is used by the database to recover i and therefore to compute
h(i ◦ ID).
3. The database checks the validity of these values according to its recorded
data. If all is fine, it sends a random number r and the value h(r ◦ i ◦ ID) to
the tag, through the reader.
4. Since the tag knows i and ID and receives r, it can check whether or not
h(r ◦ i ◦ ID) is correct. If this is case, the tag calculates its new identifier
ID′ := r ◦ ID and i∗ := i, which is used in the next identification. Otherwise
it does not calculate ID′.
Note that due to resilience considerations, an entry is not erased when the
database has replied to the tag, but a copy is kept until the next correct session:
if the third step fails, the database will still be able to identify the tag the next
time with the “old” entry. Thus two entries per tag are used in turn.
Attack based on the non-randomness of the sent information. The first
attack consists of tracking a tag, in a probabilistic way, taking advantage of the
side channel supplied by ∆i. Indeed, since the tag increases its value i every
time it receives a request (Step 2), even if the identification finally fails, while
i∗ is updated only when the identification succeeds (Step 4), an attacker may
interrogate the tag several times to abnormally increase i and therefore ∆i.
Thanks to the fact that this value is sent in the message from the tag to the
reader, the attacker is then able to (probabilistically) recognise his target later
according to this value: if the adversary later interrogates a tag that sends an
abnormally high ∆i, he concludes that this is his target.
Attack based on refreshment avoidance. Another attack consists of cor-
rupting the hash value sent from the reader to the tag. When this value is not
correct, “the message is discarded and no further action is taken” [7], so the tag
does not refresh its identifier. Note, however, that it is difficult to modify this
message due to the fact that the communication channel is wireless. We there-
fore propose a practical variant of this attack: when a reader interrogates a tag,
the attacker interrogates this tag as well before the reader carries out the third
step. Receiving the request from the attacker, the tag increases i. Consequently,
the hash value sent by the reader seems to be incorrect since i has now changed.
More generally, an attacker can always trace a tag between two correct identifi-
cations. In other words, this attack is possible because the signal to refresh the
identifier comes from the outside of the tag, i.e., the reader.
Attack based on database desynchronisation. A more subtle and definitive
attack consists of desynchronising the tag and the database. In order to do
this, when a reader queries a tag, the attacker performs the third step of the
identification before the reader does it. The random value r sent in the third step
by the attacker is the neutral element of the operation ◦. Typically, if ◦ is the
exclusive-or operation (according to [7]), the attacker replaces r by the null bit-
string and replaces h(r◦i◦ID) by h(i◦ID) obtained by eavesdropping the second
message of the current identification. We have trivially h(0⊕ i⊕ ID) = h(i⊕ ID).
Hence, the tag does not detect the attack and computes its new identity ID′ =
0⊕ ID (which is equal to its “old” identity) and it updates i∗. Therefore, in the
next identification, the tag and the database will be desynchronised, since the
tag computes the hash value using the “old” ID and the “new” i∗ whereas the
database checks the hash value with the “old” ID and the “old” i∗: the test fails
and the received message is discarded. Consequently, the database will never
send the signal to refresh the tag’s identifier and the tag is definitively traceable.
4 Traceability at the Communication layer
4.1 Singulation Protocols
With several entities communicating on a same channel, we need to define some
rules to avoid collisions and therefore to avoid information loss. This arises in
RFID systems because when a reader sends a request, all the tags in its field
reply simultaneously, causing collisions. The required rules are known as the
collision avoidance protocol. The tags’ computational power is very limited and
they are unable to communicate with each other. Therefore, the readers must
deal with the collision avoidance themselves, without the help of tags. Usually,
they consist of querying the tags until all identifiers are obtained. We say that
the reader performs the singulation of the tags because it can then request them
selectively, without collision, by indicating the identifier of the queried tag in its
request.
The collision avoidance protocols which are used in the current RFID sys-
tems are often (non-open source) proprietary algorithms. Therefore, obtaining
information on them is difficult. Currently, several open standards appear and
they are used more and more instead of proprietary solutions. We distinguish the
EPC2 family [4] from the ISO family [9]. Whether they are is EPC or ISO, there
are several collision avoidance protocols. Choosing one of them depends (in part)
on the used frequency. EPC proposes standards for the most used frequency, i.e.,
13.56MHz and 860-930MHz. ISO proposes standards from 18000-1 to 18000-6
where 18000-3 corresponds to the frequency 13.56MHz, and 18000-6 corresponds
to the frequency 860-960MHz. We have two main classes of collision avoidance
protocols: the deterministic protocols and the probabilistic protocols. Usually,
we use the probabilistic protocols for systems using the frequency 13.56MHz,
and the deterministic protocols for systems using the frequency 860-960MHz be-
cause they are more efficient in this case. After describing both the deterministic
and the probabilistic collision avoidance protocols in Section 4.2 and 4.3, we will
then analyse the traceability issues of these protocols.
2 Electronic Product Code.
4.2 Deterministic Protocols
Deterministic protocols rely on the fact that each tag has a unique identifier. If
we want the singulation process to succeed, the identifiers must stay unchanged
until the end of the process. In the current tags, the identifiers are set by the
manufacturer of the tag and written in the tag’s ROM. In the usual RFID sys-
tems, there is no exchange after the singulation because the reader has obtained
the expected information, i.e., the identifiers of the tags which are in its field.
Below, we use singulation identifier to denote such an identifier, or more sim-
ply identifier where there is no ambiguity with the identifier of the application
layer. We give an example of deterministic collision avoidance protocol called
tree walking.
Suppose tags have a unique identifier of bit-length `. All the possible iden-
tifiers can be visualised by a binary tree of depth `. A node at depth d in this
tree can be uniquely identified by a binary prefix b1b2...bd. The reader starts
at the root of the tree and performs a recursive depth-first search. So, at node
b1b2...bd, the reader queries all tags whose serial numbers bear this prefix, the
others remain silent. The tags reply with the d+ 1-st bit of their serial number.
If there is a collision, the reader restarts from the child of the prefix. When the
algorithm reaches a leaf, it has detected a tag. The full output of the algorithm
is a list of all tags within its field.
4.3 Probabilistic Protocols
The probabilistic protocols are usually based on a time-division multiple access
protocol, called Aloha. We describe one of the variants of Aloha, namely the
slotted Aloha. In the slotted Aloha, the access to the communication channel is
split into time slots. In general, the number of slots is chosen randomly by the
reader which informs the tags that they will have n slots to answer to its singu-
lation request. Each tag randomly chooses one slot among the n and responds to
the reader when its slot arrives. If n is not sufficiently large with regard to the
number of tags which are present, then some collisions occur. In order to recover
the missing information, the reader interrogates the tags one more time. It can
mute the tags which have not brought out collisions (switched-off technique) by
indicating their identifiers or the time slots during which they transmitted. Also,
according to the number of collisions, it can choose a more appropriate n.
Note that although all the usual tags have a (unique) singulation identifier,
this condition is not fundamentally required for Aloha, but is desirable for effi-
ciency reasons [11]. Without using these identifiers, the exchange of information
of the application layer is carried out during the singulation because the reader
cannot communicate anymore with the tag when the singulation process is com-
pleted. Note also that the singulation seems atomic from the tag’s view: whilst
a tag must reply to the reader several times when the tree walking is used, the
tag can answer only once when no collision occurs with the Aloha protocol. In
the case where the response brings out a collision, the reader restarts a new sin-
gulation process with possibly a larger n. On the other hand, if the switched-off
technique is used, then the protocol is not atomic anymore.
4.4 Threats Due to an Uncompleted Singulation Session
It is clear that deterministic collision avoidance protocols relying on the static
identifiers give an adversary an easy way to track the tags. To avoid traceability,
the identifiers would need to be dynamic. However if the identifier is modified
during the singulation process, singulation becomes impossible. So we introduce
the concept of singulation session as being the set of exchanges between a reader
and a tag which are needed to singulate the latter. When the session does not
finish, due to failures or attacks, we say that the session stays open.
Since the singulation identifier cannot be changed during a session, the idea,
to avoid traceability, is to use an identifier which is different for each session.
The fact that the tag can be tracked during a session is not really a problem
due to the shortness of such a session. In practice, the notion of singulation
session already informally exists because the readers usually send a signal at the
beginning and end of a singulation. Unfortunately, there is no reason to trust
the readers to correctly accomplish this task. In particular, a malicious reader
can voluntarily keep a session open to track the tag thanks to the unchanged
identifier. This attack cannot be avoided when the signals come from the reader
and not from the tag itself.
Contrary to what we usually think, using a probabilistic protocol based on
Aloha does not directly solve the traceability problem at the communication
layer. Because, apart from the (inefficient) Aloha-based protocols which do not
use the switched-off technique, the concept of singulation session is also needed
with probabilistic singulation protocols. Indeed, after having queried the tags,
the reader sends an acknowledgement (either to each tag or to all the tags)
to indicate which tags should retransmit (either the reader acknowledges the
identifiers of the tags it has successfully read, or it indicates the numbers of
the slots where a collision occurred). In the case where the identifiers are used,
the fact that a singulation session stays open allows an adversary to track the
tags. In the case where the acknowledgement does not contain the identifiers
but contains instead the numbers of the slots where a collision occurred, then
an attack relying on these slots is also possible, as follows: an adversary who
is in the presence of a targeted tag sends it a (first) singulation request with
the number of potential slots n. Assume the tag answers during the randomly
chosen slot starget. The tag being alone, the reader can easily link starget to the
targeted tag. The reader keeps the session opened. Later, when the adversary
meets a set of tags potentially containing its target, it interrogates the tags again,
indicating that only tags which transmitted during starget must retransmit: if a
tag retransmits, there is a high probability, depending on n and the number
of tags in the set, that it is the target of the adversary since another tag will
respond to the (2nd) singulation request during starget if, and only if, its last
session stayed opened and it transmitted during starget.
Whether we consider deterministic or probabilistic protocols, it is fundamen-
tal that singulation sessions cannot stay open. The tag needs to be able to detect
such sessions and to close them by itself. In other words, the signal needs to be
internal to the tag.
Consequently, we suggest using an internal timeout to abort singulation ses-
sions with abnormal duration. Thus, the tag starts the timeout when the sin-
gulation session begins (i.e., when it receives the first request of a singulation
session). When the timeout expires, the current session is considered as aborted.
Implementation of such a timeout strongly depends on the practical system,
e.g., the timeout could be a capacitor. When the tag receives the first request of
a singulation session, it generates a fresh identifier and loads its capacitor. Then,
each time it is queried (such that the request is not the first one of a session),
it checks whether its capacitor is empty. If this is the case, the tag erases its
identifier and does not answer until the next “first” request. If it is not the case,
it follows the protocol. Note that the duration of the capacitor may be less than
the duration of a singulation session if this capacity is reloaded periodically and
the number of reloads is counted.
4.5 Threats Due to Lack of Randomness
Changing the identifier of the tag is essential but does not suffice because these
identifiers need to be perfectly random not to supply an adversary with a source
of additional information. The use of a cryptographically secure pseudo-random
number generator (PRNG), initialised with a different value for every tag, is
indispensable for avoiding traceability. Of course, singulation must rely only on
this random identifier without requiring other characteristic data of the tag.
In the tree walking case, [5] proposes for instance using short singulation
identifiers which are refreshed for each new singulation using a PRNG. The used
identifiers are short for efficiency reasons since there are usually only few tags
in a given field. However, if the number of tags in the field is large, the reader
can impose the use of additional static identifiers, available in the tag, set by
the manufacturer! The benefit of using PRNG is therefore totally null and void.
In the case of Aloha, if the singulation identifiers do not appear in the ac-
knowledgement sent by the readers, they do not directly bring information to
an adversary. On the other hand, they supply much information through a side
channel if we analyse how the slot is chosen by the tag. If this is randomly
picked, it will not supply useful information to the adversary, but a non uniform
distribution can open the door to attacks. Unfortunately this is the case with
the current existing standards and protocols.
In order to illustrate our point, we can analyse the collision avoidance pro-
tocol proposed by Philips for its tag ICode1 Label IC [17] using the 13.56MHz
frequency. It contains a 64 bit identifier of which only 32 are used for the singu-
lation process, denoted by b1...b32. Although the tag does not have a PRNG, the
implemented collision avoidance protocol is probabilistic. The choice of the time
slot depends on the identifier of the tag and data sent by the reader. When the
reader queries a tag, it sends a request containing: the number of slots n which
the tags can use, where n ∈ {20, 21, ..., 28}, and a value h ∈ 0, ..., 25 called hash
value. The selection of the time slot si is done as follows:
si := CRC8(bh+1...bh+8 ⊕ prev)⊕ n
where CRC8 is a Cyclic Redundancy Check with generator polynomial x8+x4+
x3 + x2 + 1 and where prev is the output of the previous CRC8, initialised with
0x01 when the tag enters the field of a reader. Hence, an adversary can easily
track a tag according to the slot chosen by the tag, if he always sends the same
values h and n. One way to proceed is as follows.
An adversary sends to his (isolated) targeted tag a request with the number
of slots n and the hash value h . The tag responds during slot starget. When
he meets a set of m tags, the adversary wants to know if his target is here. In
order to do this, he sends a singulation request containing the same n and h. If
no tag responds during starget then the target is not included in the set of tags.
However, the conditional probability that the tag is in the set given that at least
one tag answers during slot starget is
P (n,m, p) =
p
p+ (1− p)(1− (n−1n )m)
,
where p is the probability that the target is in the set3.
Consequently, choosing the identifier, in the case of the three walking-based
protocols, and choosing the time slot, in the case of the Aloha-based protocols,
must be done using a cryptographically secure PRNG. Otherwise, an adversary
may take advantage of the distorted distribution in order to track his target in
a probabilistic way, or worse, to recover its identifiers as with the ICode1 tag.
5 Traceability at the Physical Layer
The physical signals exchanged between a tag and a reader can allow an adver-
sary to recognise a tag or a set of tags even if the information exchanged can
not be understood. All efforts to prevent traceability in the higher layers may
be rendered useless if no care is taken at the physical layer.
5.1 Threats Due to Diversity of Standards
The parameters of radio transmission (frequency, modulation, timings, etc) fol-
low given standards. Thus all tags using the same standard should send very
similar signals. Signals from tags using different standards are easy to distin-
guish. A problem arises when we consider sets of tags rather than a single tag.
In a few years, we may all be walking around with many tags in our belong-
ings. If several standards are in use, each person may have a set of tags with a
characteristic mix of standards. This mix of standards may allow a person to be
traced. This method may be especially good at tracing certain types of persons,
like military forces or security personnel.
3 Note that in the particular case of the ICode1 tag, where the CRC-8 is applied on
a 8-bit word, we can actually recover 8 bits of the identifier by sending only one
singulation request! Therefore, by sending 4 requests with respectively h = 0, h = 8,
h = 16, and h = 24, the adversary will be able to recover the 32 bits of the tag’s
singulation identifier.
To reduce the threats of traceability due to characteristic groups of tags it is
thus of paramount importance to reduce the diversity of the standards used in
the market. Note that even if it is possible to agree on a single standard to use
when RFID tags become popular, there will be times when a standard for a new
generation of tags will be introduced. During the period of transition it will be
possible to trace people due to characteristic mixes of old and new tags.
5.2 Threats Due to Radio Fingerprinting
Radio fingerprinting is a technique that has been used in mobile telephony to
recognise cloned phones. By recording characteristic properties of the transmit-
ted signals it is possible to tell a cloned cell-phone from the original one. Small
differences in the transient behaviour at the very beginning of a transmission
allows for the identification of transceivers even if they are of the same brand
and model [20]. In the case of RFID tags, there will be too many tags in circu-
lation to make it possible to distinguish a single tag from all other tags of the
same model. Nevertheless, there will be several manufacturers in the market and
their tags will have different radio fingerprints. It will thus be possible to trace
a person by a characteristic mix of tags from different manufacturers.
Preventing traceability through radio fingerprinting seems quite difficult.
There is no benefit for the manufacturers to produce tags that use exactly the
same technology, producing the same radio fingerprint. Much more likely, man-
ufacturers will experiment with different technologies in order to produce tags
that have either better performance, price or size.
6 Conclusion
As we have shown in this paper, until now privacy issues in RFID systems
have only been considered in classical cryptographic models with little concern
for the practical effects on traceability when the theory is put into practice.
We have shown that, contrary to the three basic concepts of cryptography, i.e.,
confidentiality, authentication, and integrity, traceability has to be considered
with regard to the communication architecture. Thus, to create a fully privacy-
friendly RFID system, privacy has to be ensured at each of the three layers of
the communication model. We have described the threats that affect each of
these layers and we have given some practical examples in order to illustrate
our theories. We have included recommendations or solutions for each of these
layers, although we have found that ensuring both privacy and scalability at the
application layer seems difficult without sacrificing the low cost constraint.
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